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Budget Deficit Mythology 
Preston J. Miller* 
Interviewer: So what do you say to all those 
political and private leaders who worry that a 
continuous string of high deficits will require a 
huge amount of government borrowing that will 
crowd out private credit demands, force interest 
rates back up again and threaten to abort the 
recovery? 
Norman Ture: Poppycock is a good word. I 
haven t used that word in ages. Balderdash is 
equally appropriate. That reasoning is without 
any basis in fact or analysis.
1 
Such blanket assurances about the effects of prospective 
deficits are, of course, monkeydoodle. For there is in-
deed a basis in both fact and analysis for worrying about 
a policy of permanent deficits. It can be found in writ-
ings of economists from all persuasions: Keynesians 
such as Walter Heller, George Perry, and Lawrence 
Klein; monetarists such as Milton Friedman and mem-
bers of the Shadow Open Market Committee; rational 
expectationists such as Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace, 
and Preston Miller.
2 
Although most people concede that there is a basis 
for worrying about permanent deficits, Ture still would 
have plenty of company if he were arguing that, as a 
particular case, the current budget situation is no cause 
for alarm. And those who would agree with him could 
be right for a few reasons. First, not enough observations 
are yet available to determine whether the government 
has embarked on a new policy of permanently higher 
deficits or whether these higher deficits are temporary 
and will be lowered by future spending cuts and tax 
increases. This distinction between permanent and tem-
porary deficits is important because people's actions 
depend on the whole path of deficits they expect in the 
future. Second, economics is not an exact science: no 
one really knows whether deficits of the size recently 
experienced are large enough to seriously damage the 
economy, even if they are permanent. We can only state 
there is a significant risk that they will. 
Although these are some valid reasons to question 
whether the current budget situation is a cause for con-
cern, many other arguments which have surfaced in sup-
port of current budget policy
3 have the status of myths: 
they simply do not hold up under close scrutiny. By 
identifying five of these major myths and by presenting 
counterarguments to dispel them, this paper seeks to 
clear up some of the confusion about current budget 
policy so that we can better assess what needs to be 
done. 
Myth 1 Our large budget deficits have been 
caused by a weak economy, and they 
will go away as the economy recovers. 
As evidence, supporters of this myth use projections 
based on the administration's fiscal 1984 budget or the 
*Miller is monetary adviser in the Research Department of the Federal 
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Sturrock of the Congressional Budget Office, who carefully critiqued an earlier 
draft. Neither Sturrock nor the CBO is responsible for the views expressed in this 
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3 By current budget policy I mean those government policies of taxes and 
expenditures in effect at the beginning of 1984. As defined here, current budget 
policy does not incorporate any proposals for deficit reductions which have yet to 
be enacted, such as those in the administration's fiscal 1985 budget. Fuller discus-
sion is provided in this paper's section on "Determining Current Budget Policy." 
1 congressional budget resolution (First Concurrent Reso-
lution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1984). Both indi-
cate deficits will decline sharply over the next few years 
(U.S. Congress, CBO 1983, p. 100). 
Granted, a weak economy did contribute to the 
growth in deficits over the past few years, and a continu-
ation of the current economic recovery would restrain 
their growth in the future. However, this myth vastly 
overstates the extent to which the recession accounted 
for the growth in deficits and the extent to which a 
continued recovery would reduce them. Moreover, the 
myth fails to recognize the primary contribution of 
policy actions to prospective deficits. Close scrutiny of 
the budget reveals that policy actions which raised spend-
ing and lowered taxes contributed importantly to the 
growth in deficits. Because of these actions, deficits will 
remain about 5 percent of GNP (roughly $200 billion) 
even if the economic recovery continues (Beeman and 
Van de Water 1983).
4 
Measuring the Effects of Policy on Deficits 
In order to measure the contribution that policy actions 
have made to projected deficits, it is necessary to isolate 
their effect from those budgetary effects caused by 
changes in economic conditions. One way of doing this 
is to estimate what the budget would be in any given 
year under some standard set of economic conditions. If 
we then compare these standardized budgets for any two 
given years, the differences between these budgets 
should be due primarily to new policies enacted between 
those years.
5 
To confront the first myth, this method is applied to 
compare budgets in two years: fiscal 1981, representing 
the budget just before the current administration's poli-
cies took effect, and fiscal 1986, representing the budget 
under current policies.
6 The actual budget in fiscal 1981 
is compared to the budget projected in fiscal 1986, as-
suming that current policies are continued and that eco-
nomic conditions return to those of 1981. (Fiscal 1986 
is chosen to represent the budget under current policies 
because it is easier to standardize for economic condi-
tions using that year, the choice has little, if any, bearing 
on the results.) Because economic conditions are being 
held constant, the differences in these two budgets 
should be due primarily to differences in policies enacted 
since fiscal 1981. 
Some would object that we can have little faith in an 
analysis which relies on a point forecast of a very un-
certain quantity several years into the future. But the 
uncertainty of budget forecasts stems mainly from the 
uncertainty of future policies and future economic condi-
tions. In this exercise, however, there is no uncertainty 
about either because they are both taken as given. The 
forecast is little more than a technical exercise which 
asks, what would the budget be if current policies were 
continued into the future and if economic conditions 
were to resemble those of fiscal 1981? 
• Determining Current Budget Policy 
The difficult part of this exercise is to resolve what 
current budget policy is. This part is also crucial because 
it determines the proportion of deficits caused by policy 
actions, as opposed to a weak economy, and it indicates 
the amount of deficit-reducing measures required to 
achieve a balanced budget for any given economic con-
ditions. 
For those who promulgate this first myth, current 
policy is commonly taken as the programs and taxes 
proposed in the summer of 1983 in either the updated 
fiscal 1984 administration budget or the fiscal 1984 con-
gressional budget resolution. But neither of these is cur-
rent policy. The administration budget included propo-
sals to curtail domestic spending, such as a reduction in 
job training programs and a freeze in federal salaries— 
proposals that Congress flatly rejected. The congres-
sional budget resolution, meanwhile, called for spending 
cuts of $12 billion over the next three years—cuts that 
Congress was unable to legislate during the 1983 session. 
Most significantly, both the administration and con-
gressional budgets for fiscal 1984 contained sizable tax 
increases, which formed the major part of their respec-
tive deficit-reduction measures. Yet none of these pro-
posed tax increases is likely to be enacted soon. In 1983 
the administration declared that it no longer supported 
its own tax contingency plan, which it had predicted 
4In this paper all budget figures reported are calculated on a unified, or cash, 
basis rather than a National Income Accounts, or accrual, basis. The choice of one 
basis over the other does not affect my conclusions. 
5 Expenditures and revenues can vary due to noneconomic factors as well. For 
instance, demographic changes resulting in a larger fraction of the population 
moving into the over-62 age bracket will cause increased expenditures for Social 
Security. Over a period of a few years, however, noneconomic factors will 
probably account for little change in expenditures or revenues. Even if they 
account for much of the forecasted deficits in the next few years, that would also 
contradict those who claim the deficit problem will disappear as the economy 
recovers. 
6Fiscal years run from October of the previous calendar year through 
September of the current calendar year. 
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would take effect in fiscal 1986. (Moreover, no new 
major tax proposals are included in the administration's 
fiscal 1985 budget.) Congress, meanwhile, failed to 
meet any part of its own instruction to raise taxes by 
$73 billion over the next three years. 
The bottom line is that we cannot assume that cur-
rent budget policy is embodied either in fiscal 1984's 
administration budget or in that year's congressional 
budget resolution. Both budgets give an overly optimistic 
outlook on the deficit because both assume spending 
cuts and tax increases which have little chance of being 
enacted. Nor can we assume that the administration's 
fiscal 1985 budget is current policy, for it contains pro-
posals that Congress has yet to consider or enact. 
• Recent CBO Projections Reflect Current Policy 
One good candidate for current policy is what is as-
sumed in recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
projections for fiscal 1984 through 1988 (Beeman and 
Van de Water 1983). These projections better reflect 
actions taken to date. They assume no tax increases. 
And although the projections were made before the 
1983 congressional session was completed, the omis-
sions of actions subsequently taken seem to be minor 
and tend to be largely offsetting. 
Policy Contributions to the Deficit 
In order to determine how much of the increase in pro-
jected deficits is due to policy actions since fiscal 1981, 
I adjust the recent CBO projections for 1986 to reflect 
1981 economic conditions. (For a detailed explanation 
of how these adjustments are made, see the note in 
Table 1.) 
Comparison of the first and second columns of Table 
1 shows how much different budget items change be-
tween fiscal 1981 and fiscal 1986. The one exception is 
net interest, where the comparison reflects the cumula-
tive growth of deficits during all of the intervening years. 
The third column of Table 1 shows that the increase 
in expenditures as a percent of GNP is not shared 
equally among the various spending categories. The 
categories showing the largest increases are (from 
greater to lesser) net interest, national defense, and Medi-
care and Medicaid. These increases more than offset the 
cuts in welfare programs, government operating expense, 
state and local government grants, and nondefense re-
search and development—all of which compose the cate-
gories of entitlements and nondefense discretionary 
spending. 
In terms of revenue, the largest reduction is in indi-
vidual income taxes due to the combined effects of the 
Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981 and the 
Tax Equity and Financial Responsibility Act (TEFRA) 
of 1982. Because ERTA decreases revenues, it in-
creases the deficit. And TEFRA only partially offsets 
these decreased revenues. Table 1 shows that if ERTA 
and TEFRA had not been enacted—all other things 
being equal—the deficit relative to GNP would have 
been lower in fiscal 1986 by 3.9 percentage points. 
In terms of the deficit, Table 1 reveals that with 
economic conditions about the same as in 1981, current 
policies will produce a deficit at 5.9 percent of GNP in 
1986, up 3.9 percentage points from 2.0 percent of 
GNP under policies effective in fiscal 1981. About one-
half of the increase in the deficit is caused by policy 
actions that increased expenditures, the other half by 
policy actions that lowered revenues. Thus, the increase 
in deficits in current and prospective years is not due to 
economic conditions—as proponents of this myth would 
maintain—but largely to policy actions. 
Some might argue that the deficit would shrink 
further as employment expanded above its weak 1981 
rate. Higher employment would reduce government 
spending on unemployment compensation and increase 
revenues from corporate and personal income taxes. 
However, even if we suppose that in 1986 the unem-
ployment rate is reduced to 6 percent (a common defini-
tion of high employment), the deficit under current poli-
cies would still be roughly 5 percent of GNP. 
Myth 2 Prospective deficits, even with no 
further policy actions, are small 
relative to the size of our economy. 
As evidence, government analysts—assuming no policy 
changes, moderate real growth and inflation, and stable 
interest rates—project that deficits over the next few 
years will be only 5 to 5.5 percent of GNP. 
Projected Deficits Are Unprecedented 
Although the ratio of projected deficits to GNP seems 
small, 5 to 5.5 percent of GNP is actually large relative 
to post-World War II experience. In fact, the magnitude 
of deficits being projected is unprecedented in modern 
U.S. history (see Chart 1). In the period between World 
War II and fiscal 1982, the ratio of deficits to GNP 
grew larger in years of recession and then shrunk in 
years of recovery; but even in the depths of recession, 
3 Table 1 
Policy actions contributed to increases in the deficit. 
Percentage Point Changes in Budget Items From Fiscal 1981 to Fiscal 1986 
When Fiscal 1986 Projections Are Adjusted to Fiscal 1981 Economic Conditions 
Percent of GNP 
(2) 
(D  Fiscal 1986  (3) 
Fiscal 1981  (CBO baseline  Change 
(actual)  projections*)  (2)-(1) 
Expenditures 
National Defense  5.5%  7.2%  +1.7% 
Entitlements & Other Mandatory Spending 
Social Security Benefits  4.8  4.8  — 
Medicare and Medicaid  2.0  2.6  +0.6 
Other  3.9  2.8  -1.1 
Total Entitlements  10.7  10.2  -0.5 
Nondefense Discretionary Spending  5.1  4.0  -1.1 
Net Interest  2.4  4.2  +1.8 
Offsetting Receipts  -0.8  -0.9  -0.1 
Total Expenditures  22.9  24.7  +1.8 
Revenues 
Individual Income Taxes  10.0  8.4  -1.6 
Corporate Income Taxes  2.1  1.8  -0.3 
Social Insurance Taxes  6.4  7.1  +0.7 
Excise Taxes  1.4  0.9  -0.5 
All Other  1.0  0.6  -0.4 
Total Revenues  20.9  18.8  -2.1 
Deficit (Expenditures less Revenues) 
Total Deficit  2.0  5.9  +3.9 
Effects of Legislation on Revenue 
Economic Recovery Tax Act (1981)  —  -5.0  -5.0 
Tax Equity and Financial 
Responsibility Act (1982)  —  1.1  1.1 
Total  -3.9  -3.9 
*The CBO projections for 1986 are adjusted to the 1981 rates of unemployment, inflation, and interest—economic conditions to 
which the budget is most sensitive. 
The unemployment rate in fiscal 1981 was 7.4 percent, while the CBO projection for fiscal 1986 is 7.6 percent. Thus, the 
unemployment rates are sufficiently close in the two years that no further adjustments are necessary. 
The inflation rate (measured using the GNP deflator) in calendar 1981 was 9.4 percent; in 1986 the CBO projects it to be 4.8 
percent. To control for the difference in inflation rates, all budget totals are expressed as percents of nominal GNP. This 
adjustment approximately controls for inflation because the tax indexing scheduled to go into effect in fiscal 1985 will make the 
budget approximately neutral with respect to inflation. This adjustment also controls for the scale of the economy. Thus, a 
doubling in both deficits and GNP would keep their ratio constant and would be considered no change in policy. 
Interest rates, which primarily affect net interest payments, are adjusted as follows. The rate for 90-day Treasury bills was 
14.1 percent in calendar 1981, and in 1986 the CBO projects it to be 7.4 percent. The CBO net interest projection is adjusted 
using CBO guidelines by assuming interest rates are 10 percent, 12 percent, and 14 percent in calendar years 1984,1985, and 
1986, respectively. It should be emphasized that these assumptions about interest rates are not a forecast; they are merely 
assumptions needed to get comparable interest rates underlying the budgets in the two years. When the interest rates are 
adjusted, net interest for 1986 is increased by 12 percentage points. In fact, net interest is the only CBO projection that requires 
adjustment for this exercise. 
Source: 1981 figures provided by CBO; 1986 projections and adjustment guidelines for net interest from Beeman and Van de 
Water 1983 
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the ratio never hit 5 percent. The first year that the ratio 
exceeded 5 percent was fiscal 1983. More disconcerting 
is what makes these projected deficits so different from 
past experience: for the first time, they do not decline 
relative to GNP as the economy recovers. 
Reduced Capacity to Finance Deficits 
Looking at deficits relative to GNP can also give a mis-
leading indication of their size relative to the resources 
available to finance them. Our capacity to finance defi-
cits can be assessed from two perspectives: first, deficits 
relative to total new supplies of credit; second, deficits 
relative to the government's implicit tax revenues. 
• Deficits and New Credit Supplies 
We can get a measure of the new supplies of credit 
available to finance deficits by examining a GNP budget 
identity and then by observing the ranges within which 
the quantities in the identity have moved historically. 
(For an explanation of how this GNP budget identity is 
derived, see the Appendix.) The identity states that fed-
eral deficits equal the excess of savings over investment 
plus the excess of imports over exports: 
(d + rb) = (sN - iN) + (im - ex) 
where lowercase letters indicate the quantities are ex-
pressed as ratios to GNP and where 
d — the federal deficit net-of-interest 
rb = interest on federal debt (the current interest 
rate times the stock of privately held federal 
bonds) 
sN = private savings available to finance additions 
to the capital stock (gross savings less 
depreciation) 
iN= investment to add to capital stock (gross 
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5 im = imports 
ex = exports. 
This identity makes clear that an increase in the govern-
ment deficit relative to GNP (d + rb) must be financed 
by an increase in the ratio of net saving sN, a decline in 
the ratio of investment iN, or an increase in the ratio of 
net imports (im — ex). 
A concern voiced by many about our capacity to 
finance deficits at 5 percent of GNP is that they will 
absorb most of the pool of private net savings. As a 
result, either net investment will be crowded out or im-
ports will have to exceed exports, thereby causing a 
severe trade imbalance. (These views are expressed in 
Friedman, B. 1983 and Volcker 1983). Since 1950, 
when deficits averaged less than 2 percent of GNP, 
private net savings have varied in a narrow band of 5 to 
8 percent of GNP, while net imports have ranged from 
— 1 to 0 percent of GNP. If private net savings do not 
rise from their historical rates, the projected rise in defi-
cits will absorb more than 60 percent of their total and 
will require some combination of lower net investment 
or higher net imports than experienced in the past. Since 
most analysts agree that net investment should be higher 
rather than lower in order to more rapidly increase the 
capital stock, the deficits' effect on investment is unde-
sirable. However, when imports greatly exceed exports, 
foreigners acquire our debt. This effectively lowers our 
capital stock because the returns on capital go to foreign-
ers who hold our debt, rather than being used for domes-
tic consumption. In either case, if private net savings 
remain unchanged, higher deficits will lead to lower 
domestic consumption in the future. 
• Deficits and Inflation 
Another concern about our capacity to finance prospec-
tive deficits is that they will require high inflation rates. 
This is because financing permanent deficits requires the 
use of implicit taxes, and inflation is a major implicit tax. 
This reasoning can be explained further by referring 
to the government's steady-state budget constraint (de-
rived in the Appendix): 
D = tMM + tBB 
where 
D = the deficit net-of-interest (the difference between 
government expenditures and revenues, with 
interest payments excluded from expenditures) 
M = the monetary base 
B = the stock of privately held federal bonds 
tM = the implicit tax rate on money 
tB = the implicit tax rate on bonds. 
This constraint states that a permanent deficit net-of-
interest must be financed by implicit taxes levied on the 
stocks of money and bonds. Under appropriate assump-
tions, the implicit tax rate on money is just the sum of 
the economy's long-term rates of inflation and real 
growth; the implicit tax rate on bonds is just the dif-
ference between the economy's long-term rates of real 
growth and real interest The constraint indicates that a 
change in policies which causes the deficit net-of-interest 
to rise requires more implicit taxation. 
Current projections suggest that, under current budget 
policy, the deficit net-of-interest has abruptly shifted up-
wards to a level of about $100 billion (see Chart 2). The 
question then naturally arises: What inflation rate is re-
quired to finance permanent deficits of this size? 
A range of answers to this question is suggested by 
using the steady-state budget constraint. I take the cur-
Chart 2 
The deficit has shifted upward abruptly. 
Deficit Net-of-Interest from 1963 to 1988 
(in billions of dollars) 
Projected 
Sources: Basic data from OMB; projections from Beeman and 
Van de Water 1983 
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rent stock of money and bonds to be $200 billion and 
$1,000 billion, respectively, and I assume this ratio of 
money to bonds is maintained over time. I take the 
permanent deficit net-of-interest to be 2 percent of GNP 
(or $60 billion in current dollars). (For a discussion of 
these assumptions, see Miller 1983b.) Under these as-
sumptions, the steady-state budget constraint indicates 
what inflation rate is required to finance a permanent 
deficit net-of-interest at 2 percent of GNP for various 
combinations of rates of real growth and real interest 
(see Table 2). 
Table 2 shows that little inflation is required to fi-
nance prospective deficits if the economy maintains a 
high real growth rate and a low real interest rate. But 
that would require a better economic performance than 
we've experienced recently. If real growth and real in-
terest rates were to match their averages of the previous 
two decades (3.5 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively), 
then an inflation rate of 11.5 percent would be required.
7 
However, even this inflation rate may be too optimistic 
as a longer-term forecast. So far in the 1980s, real 
growth has averaged only 1.1 percent, while the real 
interest rate has averaged 4.3 percent. In this light, it 
seems conservative to assume that in coming years the 
real growth rate will match the real interest rate. Even 
under this conservative assumption, Table 2 indicates 
that an inflation rate of about 25 to 30 percent per year 
would be required to finance prospective deficits. 
The implication of these computations is quite clear. 
Only if we're extremely lucky can prospective deficits be 
financed without much inflation. The great risk, how-
ever, is that they will require high inflation rates. 
Myth 3 The economy is thriving, so deficits 
can't be all that important. 
As evidence, proponents of this myth point out that over 
the four quarters of 1983, real GNP grew by about 6.1 
percent while inflation (measured by the GNP deflator) 
rose by about 4.1 percent. 
Deficits Matter in the Long Run 
It is hardly surprising that output is growing rapidly 
while prices are rising moderately in the first year of a 
recovery. However, one year does not a trend make. In 
a period as short as a year, business cycle movements 
can dominate longer-run trends. But the proposition that 
deficits matter for investment, real growth, and inflation 
refers to a policy of persistent deficits affecting the be-
Table 2 
Prospective deficits may require high inflation. 
Inflation Needed to Finance Deficits Net-of-Interest 
at 2% of GNP for Different Combinations of 
Rates of Real Growth and Real Interest 
(average annual percentages) 
0 
Real Interest Rate (%) 


































Source: Based on calculations using the steady-state budget 
constraint and assumptions stated in the text 
havior of these variables on average over business cycles. 
Even though real growth and inflation were favorable 
in 1983, their performance can still be consistent with 
the proposition that deficits do matter in the long term. 
For instance, Miller (1983a) used a vector autoregres-
sive model (VAR) to show that deficits do matter; an 
updated version of the VAR predicted that over the four 
quarters of 1983, real GNP would be 8.9 percent and 
inflation 4.4 percent—an even stronger economy than 
actually occurred.
8 
Interest Rates Are Atypically High 
At least one economic indicator has been behaving 
atypically in the current recovery and does have portent 
for future trends: the level of interest rates. When com-
1The real interest rate is calculated as the difference in each quarter between 
the average 90-day Treasury bill rate and the increase in the GNP deflator at an 
annual rate. 
8The earlier VAR uses data from 1967:1 to 1981:4. The updated VAR uses 
data from 1967:1 to 1982:4. 
7 Chart 3 
This recovery's unusually high interest rates seem due more to 
government policies than to economic conditions. 
1976-77 Recovery Average  1983 Recovery 













Deficit as a 
Percentage of 
Nominal GNP" 
* Percentage change from fourth quarter to fourth quarter 
"Unified deficit in fiscal year as a percentage of nominal GN P in calendar year 
Sources: Federal Reserve Board of Governors; U.S. Department of Commerce 
pared with the previous 1976-77 recovery years, the 
level of interest rates in 1983 was roughly 3.5 percent-
age points higher (see Chart 3). Other economic indica-
tors in Chart 3 suggest that high 1983 interest rates 
cannot be explained solely by current economic condi-
tions. While growth in nominal GNP was about the 
same in 1983 as it was on average in 1976-77, real 
growth in GNP was higher and inflation (measured by 
the GNP deflator) was lower. According to some 
theories and empirical work, these observations taken by 
themselves suggest that 1983 interest rates should have 
been the same as or lower than they were on average in 
1976-77—not higher.
9 
Although some of the difference in the two periods' 
interest rate levels could be due to structural changes in 
the economy after 1977, these changes seem to explain 
only a small part of the difference. More important in 
explaining the difference are changes in deficit and 
monetary policies (Eckstein 1983). As Chart 3 shows, 
growth in both deficits and the monetary base has been 
higher in the 1983 recovery. And the outlook for deficits 
is much less favorable than in 1976-77. In 1977, the 
deficit as a percent of GNP was halved from the 1976 
level. The current outlook, however, calls for no mean-
ingful decline. 
Proponents of this third myth tend to ignore the im-
plications of higher interest rates. Higher interest rates 
are composed of some combination of a higher real 
9In neoclassical growth models which don't consider interest taxation, for 
instance, the rates of real growth and real interest are equal, and as long as 
inflationary expectations are accurate, the nominal interest rate will equal the 
growth rate of nominal GNP. Empirical money demand functions, meanwhile, 
frequently include nominal GNP as a dependent variable (and not real GNP and 
the GNP deflator) to represent the volume of transactions (Duprey 1980). Other 
theories (for example, Miller 1982a) and empirical work(for example, Fama 1975 
and Willes 1978) suggest that movements in interest rates should closely parallel 
movements in inflation. 
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interest rate and a higher inflation premium. A higher 
real interest rate generally predicts lower real growth, 
and a higher inflation premium generally predicts higher 
inflation. Thus, it follows that higher interest rates most 
likely imply that the economy faces slower real growth, 
higher inflation, or some combination of the two in com-
ing years. 
Myth 4 Interest rates are high not because 
of deficits but because the Fed has 
been too expansionary. Once the Fed 
regains control of the money supply, 
interest rates will come down. 
As evidence, proponents of this myth show that growth 
in the monetary base was high in 1983 and that high 
money growth historically has been associated with high 
inflation and interest rates. 
The rationale for high interest rates in this myth is 
deficient in two ways. First, it does not address why real 
(inflation-adjusted) interest rates are high; second, it 
does not acknowledge the degree to which money 
growth is influenced by deficit policy. 
High Real Interest Rates 
In this myth, the explanation of high interest rates is 
based on the following causal chain: higher money 
growth leads to higher inflation, which gets reflected in a 
higher inflation premium in interest rates. But this chain 
of causation can only predict that one component of 
interest rates, the inflation premium, will grow; it does 
not predict that the other component, the real interest 
rate, should grow. (The real interest rate is the difference 
between the interest rate and the inflation premium.) Yet 
throughout 1983, the interest rate on 90-day Treasury 
bills exceeded the actual inflation rate by about 4.5 
percentage points—a real interest rate which, before 
1981, had not been attained since the Great Depression. 
Monetary and Deficit Policies 
The myth also fails to acknowledge the degree to which 
monetary and deficit policies must be coordinated. That 
the two policies are closely interrelated can be demon-
strated by referring to the steady-state budget constraint 
(discussed in Myth 2 and derived in the Appendix): 
D = tMM + tBB. 
Because the constraint states that deficits must be fi-
nanced by implicit taxes on money and bonds, it makes 
clear that a permanent deficit policy is feasible only if 
the government can raise sufficient implicit taxes to fi-
nance the deficits. For a given deficit policy, monetary 
policy acts by exchanging money and bonds, which 
changes their relative supplies. This then affects the real 
rate of interest, the inflation rate, and the real demands 
for money and bonds. For a given deficit policy, a mone-
tary policy will determine the government's implicit tax 
take. Only those monetary policies are feasible for which 
the resulting implicit tax take is sufficient to finance the 
deficits (see Miller 1983a). 
Thus, it is conceivable that the growth in money is 
only the proximate determinant of inflation and interest 
rates, while it is deficit policy that is driving them all. If 
the deficit policy changes, as it has, to imply higher 
deficits year-in and year-out, monetary policy over time 
must also change to allow faster money growth (Sargent 
and Wallace 1981; Miller 1982b). Only by inflating 
more is it possible to raise the implicit taxes necessary to 
finance the higher deficits. Contrary to what this myth 
suggests, in the face of large deficits it simply is not 
feasible for the Fed to maintain control of money for 
long. 
Myth 5 The budget deficit situation is 
hopeless. Expenditures already have 
been cut as much as possible, and 
attempting to close deficits by tax 
increases is counterproductive. 
As evidence, proponents of this myth point out that 
nondefense discretionary spending has taken the brunt of 
recent cuts, making further cuts in this category difficult 
to achieve. Meanwhile, they point out that the major 
scheduled spending increases are in defense, interest, 
and entitlements—none of which is controllable. And 
they argue that raising taxes to close deficits won't work 
for two reasons: first, tax increases will send the econ-
omy into a tailspin, which will automatically increase 
the deficit; second, the government will just spend the 
extra revenue, as it always has in the past. 
Setting Goals for Deficit Reduction 
At the heart of the hopelessness expressed in this myth 
are misconceptions about how large a deficit reduction 
should be attempted and the time frame within which the 
reduction should occur. If the goal were a prompt return 
to a balanced budget within a year, for instance, then the 
9 situation would appear bleak. However, a more modest 
and reasonable goal is to reduce deficits over a span of 
about three years to the point that budget policy is com-
patible with noninflationary real growth. This goal can 
be achieved by policy actions well within the bounds of 
postwar experience. 
The goal of a prompt return to a balanced budget is 
not inherently wrong, but besides being practically unob-
tainable, it implies that 
• There must be a sizable surplus of current revenues 
over spending on current programs to offset the 
interest on the debt. 
• There will be no further additions to total debt, so 
that the ratio of debt to GNP will steadily be declin-
ing over time. 
If we view the current ratio of publicly held debt to 
GNP (about 31 percent) to be the burden we are carry-
ing for running deficits in the past, it seems reasonable to 
set as a goal the amount of deficit reduction necessary to 
stabilize this ratio at its current level without requiring 
the use of the inflation tax. 
Estimating Required Deficit Reduction 
The steady-state budget constraint can give estimates of 
how much the deficit must be reduced to meet this more 
modest goal. Table 3 indicates the permanent reduction 
in the deficit net-of-interest required to stabilize the ratio 
of debt to GNP without inflation for varying assump-
tions about the economy's long-term average rates of 
real growth and real interest. If the rates of real growth 
and real interest match their averages over the 1960s 
and 1970s (3.5 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively), 
Table 3 can be interpolated to indicate that the deficit 
net-of-interest must be reduced by $23 billion in terms of 
1983 GNP (or 0.8 percent of GNP) in every year to 
make budget policy compatible with price stability. If 
instead those rates match their averages so far in the 
1980s (1.1 percent and 4.3 percent, respectively), then 
the table indicates that roughly $90 billion in terms of 
1983 GNP (or 3.0 percent of GNP) in reductions must 
occur every year. Since the experience of the 1980s has 
been so atypical, it seems sufficiently prudent to assume 
that real growth and real interest rates will be approxi-
mately equal in coming years.
1
0
 This assumption implies 
that the deficit net-of-interest must be reduced by 
roughly $52-60 billion in terms of 1983 GNP (or 1.7-
Table 3 
Reducing the Deficit Without Using Inflation 
Reduction in Deficit Net-of-Interest Needed 
Each Year for Different Combinations of 
Rates of Real Growth and Real Interest 
(in billions of dollars* and as a percentage of GNP) 
Real Interest Rate (%) 



























































*Dollar amounts are calculated by applying the given percentage of GNP to 
the 1983 GNP of about $3 trillion. These amounts are provided to give a 
sense of the size of deficit reductions in terms of current dollars. For future 
years, the dollar deficit reductions would have to be scaled upward by the 
growth in GNP. 
Source: Based on calculations using the steady-state budget constraint 
and assumptions stated in the text 
2.0 percent of GNP) every year to make budget policy 
sustainable and consistent with price stability. 
Deficit Reduction Is Achievable 
Reducing the deficits by 2 percent of GNP seems 
achievable. It can be achieved with a package of spend-
ing cuts and tax increases of not unprecedented size. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that we consider the 
reasonableness of a package entailing a permanent reduc-
tion in spending net-of-interest of 1 percent of GNP and 
10ln well-articulated models, it follows that the real interest rate and, con-
sequently, the real growth rate depend on the monetary and budget policies being 
followed. In neoclassical models without interest taxation, it follows that although 
the real interest rate will depend on the mix of policies, the real growth rate will 
adjust to equal the real interest rate. 
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a permanent increase in taxes of 1 percent of GNP. 
• Spending Cuts 
Cutting noninterest spending by 1 percent of GNP in 
each year seems attainable for at least three reasons. 
First, the argument that spending isn't controllable really 
does not apply. The budget problem is long-term in 
nature and, given enough time, all expenditures are con-
trollable. Defense spending can be reduced by amounts 
increasing over time by, for instance, slowing the intro-
duction of new weapons systems; entitlement spending 
can be reduced over time by new legislation. Second, the 
President's budget for 1984 included specific proposals 
to cut spending (excluding defense and interest) by 
nearly 1 percent of GNP. Third, a cut of this size is not 
extraordinarily large from a historical perspective. One 
study based on post-World War II experience suggests 
that with no change in the budgetary process, a cut in 
spending from projected levels by 1 percent of GNP 
would occur about 42 percent of the time in the third 
year of a three-year span (Doan, Litterman, and Sims 
1983). Or put another way, a spending cut of this size 
requires no large deviation from current policy. 
• Tax Increases 
An increase in taxes on the order of 1 percent of GNP 
in each year seems feasible, too. Such an increase would 
be no larger than the last tax increase embodied in 
TEFRA. Moreover, a tax increase of this size may be 
the political price for the spending cuts which form the 
other part of the package. And since the tax increase 
would be coupled with a spending cut, this would assure 
that the additional tax revenue would be used to reduce 
deficts, rather than to increase spending. 
The remaining objection that a tax increase of 1 per-
cent of GNP will cause a recession is simply unfounded. 
The correct measure of taxation is what the government 




 For a given amount of spending, 
what an explicit tax increase really changes is the mix of 
taxes from implicit to explicit. Since implicit taxes seem 
relatively distortionary, such a change in mix should 
imply a healthier economy in the long run. While the 
change could be disruptive in the short term, it need not 
be. After all, the economy suffered one of its most 
severe recessions after the tax cut of fiscal 1981 was 
enacted. Then we were being warned that the tax cut 
was going to lead to a runaway economic boom. 
Conclusions 
From our examination of these five major myths about 
budget deficits, the following conclusions emerge: 
1. The prospective deficits are mainly due to policy 
actions, such as the defense buildup and the recent 
income tax cut, rather than to changed economic 
conditions. 
2. Prospective deficits are large relative to post-
World War II experience in the United States and 
relative to the economy's capacity to finance them. 
3. The current budget policy of high, continued defi-
cits risks high inflation. 
4. The harmful effects of deficits cannot be undone 
by monetary policy. 
5. Budget deficits can be brought down to manage-
able levels by tax increases and spending cuts of 
not unprecedented proportions. 
"The deficit net-of-interest D is formally defined as the difference between 
expenditures net-of-interest (federal purchases G plus transfers net-of-interest 77?) 
and explicit revenue T: D = G + 77? — T. By substituting this definition ioxD and 
rearranging terms, the steady-state budget constraint can be rewritten as follows: 
G + TR = T + (tMM + tBB) 
which states that total expenditures net-of-interest is the sum of explicit revenues T 
and implicit taxes t„M + tBB. 
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Deriving the GNP Budget Identity and 
the Steady-State Budget Constraint 
The GNP Budget Identity 
The GNP budget identity (referred to in Myth 2) is derived by 
combining three simple identities which hold at all points in 
time. The first identity states that GNP is equal to the total 
demand for goods: 
(1) Y=C + (IN+Dep) + G+EX-IM 
where 
Y= GNP 
C = consumption 
IN= investment net of depreciation of the capital stock 
Dep = depreciation of the capital stock 
G = federal purchases 
EX = exports 
IM = imports. 
All values are expressed in current dollars, and state and local 
government purchases are included in consumption and invest-
ment. 
The second identity states that private savings are equal to 
the amount of disposable income that is not consumed: 
(2) (SN+Dep) = Y
D — C 
where 
SN= savings net of amount needed to cover depreciation 
Y
d = disposable income. 
The third identity defines disposable income as total income 
plus government transfers less taxes: 
(3) Y
D= Y+TR+rB -T 
where 
TR = federal transfers net-of-interest on the debt 
rB = interest on the debt (the current rate of interest 
times the stock of privately held federal bonds) 
T= federal taxes. 
We can combine identities (1)-(3) to get {G + TR - T+ rB) 
= (SN~IN) + (IM-EX). Now, lettingD be the federal deficit 
net-of-interest defined by D = G + TR — T and dividing 
through by Y, we get the desired identity: 
(4) (d+rb) = (Sjv-ijv) + (l'm-ex) 
where lowercase letters indicate the quantities are expressed as 
ratios to GNP. 
The Steady-State Budget Constraint 
The steady-state budget constraint (used in Myths 2 and 4) 
applies smooth growth assumptions to the federal govern-
ment's financing identity. This identity states that the deficit is 
financed by printing money and issuing bonds: 
(5) Dt + rtBt = Mt + Bt 
where 
Mt = the change in the monetary base Mt 
per unit of time 
B = the change in the stock of privately held 
government bonds B, per unit of time 
and t subscripts refer to time. Then, in order to derive the steady-
state budget constraint, the following assumptions are made: 
(a) 7T = PJPt The inflation rate tt, which is the rate 
of change of the aggregate price level P, 
is invariant over time. 
(b) v = XJXt The real growth rate v, which is the rate 
of change of aggregate output X, is invar-
iant over time. 
[Since Yt = PtXt, assumptions (a) and (b) imply that the rate of 
change of nominal GNP is invariant over time and is equal to 
77+ V.] 
(c) rt = r = p + 7T The nominal interest rate is invariant 
over time and is equal to the sum of the 
real interest rate p and the inflation rate TT. 
(d) ~ d The deficit net-of-interest is a constant 
proportion of GNP. 
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(e) M
dt = m(p,ir) Yt Money and bond demands are propor-
tional to GNP, where the proportionality 
depends on the real interest rate and 
the inflation rate. 
(f) M
d = M( The markets for money and bonds clear, 
and 
B?=Br 
In this formulation, a change in budget policy is represented 
by a change in d and a change in monetary policy is represented 
by a change in the path of M In general, alternative feasible 
policy mixes will imply different values of 7r, v, and p; and thus, 
m(p,7r) and Z?(p, tt). Once these new values are established in 
response to a given policy mix, they are maintained for all time. 
Applying the above assumptions to the financing constraint 
generates 
(D.+rBJ/Y, = (M,+B,)/Y, 
which implies by (d) and (e) 
d + rb(p,n) = {MJM)(MJ Yt) + (B,/B,){BJY). 
This implies by (a), (b), (c), (e), and (f) that 
d + (p + 7r)Z?(p,7T) = (7T + v)m(p,7T) + (77+v)Z>(p,7T) 
which can be rewritten as 
d = (7T+v)m(p,7r) + (v—p)6(p,7r). 
Now, multiplying through by Yt, we get the steady-state budget 
constraint: 
(6) Dt = (7r+v)Mf + (v—p)B
d. 
The steady-state budget constraint is related to the GNP budget 
identity by 
(7) Dt = (S—rB—fy + (IM—EX) 
= (7r+v)M?+(v-p)5f. 
If we let tM represent the implicit tax on money (7T+v) and 
tB represent the implicit tax on bonds (v—p), we have the 
simplified version of the steady-state budget constraint used in 
the text of this article: 
(8) D = tMM + tBB. 
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